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Abstract
In this work the aim is to analyze the Hungarian Foreign Trade perfor­
mance during the period 1975-88 by using the Revealed Comparative Ad­
vantage (RCA) methodology. Hungary was the first centrally planned econ-• *
omy to introduce market - oriented reform, in 1968. This reform was called the 
New Economic Mechanism (NEM). The reform consisted of: price reforms, 
liberalized trade with the western economies, institutional reforms in the area 
of banking and taxation.
The results of this study indicate that Hungary revealed comparative ad­
vantage in commodity groups such as: industrial machinery and equipment, 
foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods; and revealed comparative disadvan­
tage with commodity groups such as: chemicals, building materials, fertilizers, 
rubber and raw materials of vegetable and animal origiir, in her overall trade 
in the world.
Keywords: Hungary’s 1968 Reform, Comparative Advantage, Revealed Compara­
tive Advantage.
ÖZET
DIŞ TİCARETTE MACARİSTAN’IN MUKAYESELİ ÜSTÜNLÜĞÜ:
1975-1988
KATALIN ZAİM 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi
Tez Yöneticisi: Y. Doc. Dr. Fatma Ta.^km 
Haziran 1992. .‘33 Sayfa
Bu çaİLŞinanın amacı Macaristan’ın 1975-88 dönemindeki dış ticaret performansının 
Açıklanan Mukayeseli üstünlükler tekniği ile incelenmesidir. Macaristan 1968 yılında 
Yeni İktisadi Mekanizma olarak da bilinen rekabete ve ticarete yönelik reformları 
sunan ilk merkezi planlı ekonomi olmuştur.
Çalışmanın sonuçları, sınai makine ve teçhizat, gıda ürünleri ve sınai tüketici 
malları ticaretinde Macaristan’ın mukayeseli üstünlüğün ü göstermektedir. Ancak, 
aynı üstünlük kimyevi maddeler, inşaat malzemeleri, gübre, lastik, hammaddeler, 
yeşil sebze ve hayvani ürünlerde görülmemektedir.
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1 Introduction
In this work the aim is to analyze the Hungarian Foreign Trade performance dur­
ing the period 1975-88 by using the Revealed C om parative  A dvantage (RCA) 
methodology. Hungary was the first centrally planned economy to introduce a broad 
market- oriented reform, in 1968. This reform was called the New Economic Mecha­
nism (NEM). The reform consisted of: price reforms, liberalized trade with western 
economies, institutional reforms in the area of banking and taxation. However, the 
overall results were unsatisfactory.
The authorities continued to maintain substantial formal and informal central 
control. Reform measures were often partial, inconsistent, and some times also 
reversed. As Prime Minister .Jozsef Antal stated in May 1990, “In the economy, 
too, everything wa^ upside down. The State embraced all activities in the direc­
tion and operation of the economy; the state enterprises were not real enterprises; 
state redistribution has pushed its way into the place of the market” (Nepszabad- 
sag,1989.Jan.3.p.l). *
Hungary’s foreign trade was characterized by a more Western country oriented 
trade during the first four years of the reform period (1968-1972), which then shifted 
its momentum toward the CMEA countries in the period of centralization (1975-80). 
The following decentralization period (1981-84) led the businesses to dedicate more 
attention again toward the western world.^ However, the country’s economy could 
not keep up with the world trend; consequently, Hungary debt increased and the 
economy entered in its so called stagnant stage. The critical turning year was 1988 
when not only the public but also the Government realized that political change 
was needed to improve the economy. As a result, Hungary had its first free election 
after forty years in 1990. The primary goal of the new Government was to shift to 
a completely open market economy.
To shed more light on the trade performance of Hungary during the period 1975- 
1988 the revealed comparative advantage methodology is adopted. This approach 
will identify the manufecturing sectors which revealed advantageous in Hungary’s 
trade with respect to the world trade performance in the period of 1975-88.
2 Historical R eview  of Economic Reform  in H un­
gary since 1968
The earliest example of a broad market- oriented reform program to be implemented 
in a centrally planned economy is Hungary’s New Economic Mechanism (NEM), 
introduced in 1968. The objective of this reform was to allow the enterprises to 
approach the world market with a competitive mind under the socialist setting 
which consisted of monoparty system and partial control of the activities of the 
enterprises by the State.
The NEM freed enterprises from mandatory plan directives and relaxed controls. 
As a result, Hungary’s economy improved in the first four to five years of the NEM 
which was also reflected in its foreign trade figures. Clark (1989) reported that the 
rate of growth of exports between 1971-75 was 9.6% and the rate of growth of imports 
was 7.5%. However, this period was not without tension. In particular, opposition to 
the decentralization of decision making proved to be stronger than anticipated. More 
specifically the years 1972-1978 were characterized by the abortion of reform. The 
1968 reform left intact most of the economic management of institutional system.
After 1968, the authorities attempted periodically to improve the NEM and to 
rejuvenate the reform process. In the saipe time, enterprises remained subject to in­
formal direct controls; in addition, substantial indirect controls governed entry, exit, 
and the selection of lines of activity. The authorities were able to affect enterprises’ 
financial results through price and wage regulations, taxes, and subsidies.
Until 1990, the scope and effectiveness of economic reform in Hungary were lim­
ited by the pressure of the social- political model. This model wiis based on the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party’s dominance of both political and economic ac­
tivities. This situation limited the implementation of the reform blueprint. As a 
result, new political reform was necessary to realize an economic transformation. For 
this purpose, the first free elections Wcis conducted the first time in forty years in 
March-April 1990. The coalition Government has formulated a comprehensive pro­
gram of economic reform aimed at moving to a market economy based on private 
ownership with a social safety net for the needy.
In the next section, the conditions prior to 1968 and the reform efforts undertaken 
after 1968 are described. The blueprint of the NEM introduced in 1968 is outlined. 
Then the reforms undertaken between 1968 and mid- 1990 with respect to: (1) the 
macroeconomic decision making system; (2) the price system; (3) the foreign trade 
and the exchange system; (4) the fiscal system; (5) the banking system and capital
2
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Figure 1; GDP at Constant Prices and Inflation Rate. Adopted from IMF Yearbook 
1990
market are going to be described. This historical review is concluded with a review
of recent economic developments and of the current economic situation. ^
«
2.1 C onditions Prior to 1968
Central planning was introduced in Hungary in the late 1940s. This meant that 
the authorities established the social ownership of production in both the industrial 
sector as well as in the agriculture. Th? macroeconomic plans were formulated at 
the center. These concerned production, investment, employment, and setting of 
wages and prices. The main objective of this period was rapid industrialization. 
This was achieved by growth and forced saving. However, the goal of this period 
was pursued in a partially insulated environment from the world economy.
Change toward decentralization was needed. The leadership approved the recom­
mendations in mid-1966, and experts prepared the detailed decrees and regulations. 
The New Economic Mechanism (NEM) was implemented on January 1, 1968.
2.2 A fter 1968 Reform  Im plem entation
The blueprint of the NEM outlined in the resolution of the Central Committee of 
the Party of May 7, 1966, represented a reform model aimed at modifying certain 
basic features of traditional central planning without overcrossing the limits of the 
established social-political system. The objective was not to reform socialism but 
rather to improve the methods of “building socialism”.
*The literature review was based on the following materials: Antal et.al.l987; Clarke 1989; 
Kornai 1987; Lendvai 1988; Revesz 1991; Richet 1989.
The most important characteristic of the NEM was its elimination of directives 
and commands from the center. Correspondingly, it abolished the central allocation 
of the means of production and inputs and authorized trading among enterprises. 
Independent enterprises were to be responsible for microeconomic decision making 
subject to a uniformly applied system of economic regulations; the interests of em­
ployees were represented in the decision-making process of enterprises. Finally, the 
MEM plan allowed a closer direct relationship between the domestic economy and 
(breign markets by introducing an unified exchange rate, price determination ac­
cording the foreign prices, and by licensing enterprises to be able to conduct foreign 
trade directly.
'¿.3 Further A m endm ents Brought to  1968 Reform s
As part of the 1968 economic reforms, the central authorities lost the power to 
o«it the output levels of the individual enterprises and also abolished the allocation 
,if materials. The enterprises were expected to become autonomous so that they 
s (iiild adjust to the market trends. However, the enterprises remained subject to the 
|\>rmal and informal interference of government supervisions and representatives of 
aocial and political organizations.
The State Enterprise Act of 1977 sought^to establish a better balance between 
centralized control and state enterprise autonomy by decreasing the supervision of 
supervisory agencies. This Act and other legislation, which took effect January 1, 
1985, established a new institutional framework for state enterprises based on self- 
Uianagement with workers’ participation. However, in large state companies, basic 
decisions over production, marketing, investment, organization, and mergers, and 
,vver the creation of subsidiaries, were determined by the enterprise’s councils. In 
vuiall enterprises of up to five hundred employees, these decisions were undertaken 
hy the assembly of employees. The enterprise councils and eissemblies could also 
,iecide on the performance criteria and selection of managers. By the latter part of 
:;987, about 73 percent of state enterprises had been transformed in this fashion and 
xvere under the supervision of enterprise councils or assemblies; 27 percent remained 
c,uder direct state control.
The poor performance of state enterprises resulted largely from interference by 
. le central authorities. The Law on Transformation adopted in June 1989 sought 
lO provide the legal framework for transforming state enterprises and cooperatives 
,iLo joint stock companies. It also allowed for the transfer of ownership in part or
whole to foreign investors.
The new Government’s goal is to reduce the share of state- owned property to less 
than half of total assets in the competitive sphere of economy by 1993. The emphases 
is to achieve privatization through market means. The Government, in its four-year 
program launched in March 1991, proposed to accelerate privatization strategy. The 
Government recognized that foreign investment brings not only financial resources, 
but also modern management methods, modern technology, and better market ac­
cess. Therefore the new Government encouraged foreign investment, allowed free 
flow of knowledge and technology from the developed countries.
2.4 P rice Reform
Before the introduction of NEM in 1968, prices were fixed by the authorities. Differ­
ences between foreign and domestic prices were compensated by transfers of special 
funds, and consumer and producer prices were separated through a complex system 
of taxes and subsidies. The 1968 reform introduced a price system based on:
1. Fixed prices set by the Government which were applied in the following tree 
areas:
• basic raw materials for industrial ¿v agricultural use such as: fuel, elec­
tricity and fertilizers;
• basic agricultural products such as corn, milk, livestock and meat;
• basic consumer goods and services such as flour, sugar, bread, meat, 
drugs, beer, housing and public transportation;
2. Flexible prices, allowed to fluctuate between officially set upper and lower 
limits and were applied in the following sectors:
• capital goods;
• manufactured consumer goods;
• processed food;
3. so-called free prices were applied for:
• fashion items and cosmetics;
• food produced by small private businesses;
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Figure 2: Change in Domestic and World Consumer expressed in Forint. Adopted 
from IMF Yearbook 1990
Figure 3: Export and Import Prices (Index Numbers, 1985=100). Adopted from 
IMF Yearbook 1990.
• other public services;
The new regulations foresaw a greater freedom for enterprises to set prices in re­
sponse to market forces, but even the free prices remained subject to considerable 
administrative control. The National Materials and Price Office intervened directly 
to prevent extreme price increases.
The Government did not undertake renewed price reform set in the 1968 blue 
print until 1979-80. First, consumer prices were raised in mid- 1979.(Fig.2) At the 
same time, the authorities reduced net food subsidies and raised the net taxation 
of luxury goods. In the same year, the prices of services, including rent and 
transportation were not adjusted, and subsidies on these items continued to increase.
Domestic prices of energy and raw materials were linked to world market prices. The 
differences between domestic prices and prices of imported inputs from the CMEA 
area was covered by the application of “producers” differential turnover taxes. The 
National Materials and Price Office monitored and enforced these complex rules.
Beginning in 1985, enterprises that could prove that a substantial part of their 
output could be exported at a profit, were eligible to join a so- called price club. 
Members of this club were freed from the pricing rules limiting profit margins, but 
they remained subject to the import price constraint.
At the beginning of 1988, producer prices were adjusted in connection with the 
introduction of a personal income tax. In addition, the differentiated turn-over taxes 
were replaced by the value-added tax (VAT), and subsidies were cut. As a result, 
agricultural and food prices increased and prices in manufacturing, construction, 
and the services sectors declined.
“On April 1, 1988 - when the general application of the advance notification of 
intended price increases expired - 20 percent of consumer prices remained subject 
to administratively set ceilings, 22 percent to the advance reporting obligation, and, 
5 percent to the price consultation process. The remaining 53 percent were sub­
ject only to the import price limitation and other general pricing rules that ensure 
compliance with the law against unfair trade practice.” (Clarke 1989.p 54.)
The new Government recognized the ne^l to increase competition through the 
liberalization of goods and factor markets to create the proper conditions for struc­
tural change and efficient resource use. From the beginning of 1991, consumer prices 
were freed from controls. Consequently, consumer prices rose to about 90 percent. 
Central control of prices remained only for commodities such as textbooks, one type 
of milk, white bread, and public utilities. The Price Office, which was responsible 
for controlling prices, was abolished in January 1991. The Government planned to 
liberalize further regulations on prices.
2.5 Foreign Trade and Exchange R ate Reform
As the Figure 4. indicates, until 1991, Hungary’s trade with the socialist word was 
greater respect to the market economies in terms of volume.
2.5.1 Trade with Market Economies
The state monopoly of foreign trade, instituted in 1948, remained intact after the 
1968 economic reform. The foreign trade was carried out by authorized state-
owned economic organizations. These were specialized foreign trade organizations 
and trading companies. These entities received general or specific permits to con­
duct foreign trade transactions on their own account or on a commission basis. 
(Revesz,1991.p.68)
In mid-1987, the authorities extended general foreign trading rights to any en­
terprise in the socialized sector whose convertible currency exports amounted to at 
least 1 million dollars in the previous year. A further major change, which ended 
the system of foreign trade as a state monopoly, was introduced at the beginning of 
1988. Under the new regulations, every organization registering with the Ministry 
of Trade, including private entities, was authorized to engage in commercial foreign 
trade transactions without prior application and approval. (Figure 4.)
2.5.2 Trade with the CMEA Area
Until the end of 1990, the bulk of Hungary^’s trade with the ruble area was con­
ducted under bilateral quotas negotiated in annual official trade agreements. These 
agreements ensured essential imports of energy and raw materials, against which 
the Government committed to export Hungarian agricultural and industrial prod­
ucts.(Ricket 1989.p.72) ^
Pricing rules guiding intra-CMEA trade clyinged over the years, from fixed prices 
in the 1950s, to an adjustment of prices at five-year intervals in the 1960s and early 
1970s; and since the mid-1970s, to annual adjustments based on moving five-year 
averages of world market prices. These rules were combined in practice, however, 
with extensive bargaining over technical cispects, rebates, discounts, and payment 
terms. As CMEA foreign trade prices remained distorted relative to world market 
prices, the Hungarian authorities applied a system of taxes and subsidies to ensure 
that enterprises achieved similar profitability in ruble trade transactions as in trade 
with convertible currency and domestic partners.(Figure 4.)
Until the beginning of 1988, enterprises received full and automatic compensation 
from the budget for the difference between the profitability of transactions with 
convertible currency or domestic customers.
In 1989, measures were taken to decrease ruble exports. The forint was appre­
ciated by 5.5 percent; some export licenses were canceled. Since January 1, 1991, 
trading with CMEA countries has been at world market prices. This involves a
^“Council for Mutual Economic As.sistance” , better known in the West as “COMECON”, des­
ignated the centrally planned economies in Europe -Bulgaria, CS.SR, GDR, Hungary, Poland, 
Romenia, and the USSR.
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Figure 4: Export and Import Volumes in CMEA and Western Countries expressed 
in Forint. Adopted from IMF Yearbook 1991
significant trade loss for Hungary. (Revesz 19^1.p.88)
T o u r i « r ic
Figure 5: Foreign Trade Multiplier, Official and Touristic Rates (Index Numbers, 
1985-100). Adopted from IMF Yearbook 1990
2.5.3 The Exchange Rate System and Export Incentives
«
During the period of central planning (before 1968) the exchange rate was unified. 
The 1968 reform set a new exchange rate system. This included the “official” rate, 
which was used for statistical purpose with no operational significance; a commercial 
rate, the so called “foreign trade multiplier”, and the noncommercial rate, called the 
“touristic rate” (trough 1976). (Figure 5.)
The official rate was abolished in 1976 and the noncommercial rate - set at Ft 
30 per U.S. dollar in 1968, as against a commercial rate of Ft 60 per U.S. dollar, 
was gradually moved closer to the commercial rate beginning in 1979. In October 
1981, the two became equivalent. Different exchange rates were applied for trade 
with other members of the CMEA. In 1968 Ft was set at Ft 40 per TR (transferable 
ruble).
After setting the commercial exchange rate in 1968, exports and imports were 
valued in domestic currency at foreign currency prices multiplied by this exchange 
rate and adjusted for customs tariffs, import turnover taxes, and subsidies. A tax 
rebate for exporters on the differential producers’ turnover tax was ineffective from 
1980 to 1988 to stimulated exports to the convertible currency area.
In the period of December 1989 and in the first months of 1990, the forint was 
depreciated by 15 percent against the basket of convertible currencies. The new 
Government depreciated the forint by a further 15 percent in .lanuary 1991. With 
the sharp reduction in trade restrictions in 1991, and the end of the CMEA trading 
arrangements, the role of exchange rate policy has been considerably increased. The
10
Government has announced its intention to achieve convertibility of the forint by 
1993.(Revesz 1991,p.91.)
2.6 Fiscal Reform
In 1968 the central Government lost the authority to issue plan directives. Under
the 1968 economic reform, the government applied a new taxe and subsidy system in
the area of production, products and incomes. The objective of this system was to
(i) secure revenues to finance government operations, investment, and consumption
expenditures; and (ii) redistribute current enterprise profits and retained earnings
in order to achieve the production, trade, income and price objectives.
During the 1975s, many of the changes were adopted in order to isolate the
domestic economy from a full adaptation to the market economy. These were in line
with the strong CMEA affiliation which required a return to the central period’s
structure. The fiscal measures such as tax level and subsidies were differentiated for »
some enterprises. These measures were individually negotiated with the authorities. 
Generally the large and inefficient companies were favoured. This lead to a multiple 
taxation with multiple aim that tented to violate the basic objectives of the 1968 
reform.
To solve the situation the government sim/lified the tax system with the price 
reform of 1980. This consisted of the shift of taxation from the production of profits 
to incomes. The 1980 reform was reversed in 1985 with a shift in the burden of 
taxation from profits and retained earnings back to the factors of production. The 
Government abolished a 40 percent levy on enterprise depreciation allowances and 
introduced a new tax of 10 percent on the wage bill of enterprises payable from 
after-tax profits; a new tax of 3 percent on the net worth of enterprises with certain 
branches exempt and others subject of penalty rates.
2.7 Banking and Capital M arket Reform
The authorities did not significantly alter the highly concentrated and specialized 
banking system and segmented financial structure of the economy - established in 
the late 1940s - until the mid-1980s. The banking sector continued after 1968 to be 
dominated by the National Bank of Hungary (NBH). The NBH performed central 
banking functions; regulated foreign exchange transactions, with responsibility for 
conducting almost all external credit operations with the convertible currency area. 
Through its credit department and branch offices the NBH acted as the principle
11
banker of the enterprise sector and helped administer government programs in in­
dustrial policy and other areas. NBH had direct control over the allocation of credit. 
It has less important role in the interest rate determination.
The other banks in the system continued to be restricted to specialized activities. 
The State Development Bank’s principal task was to prepare, monitor, and finance 
state investment projects and allocate equity to enterprises. The Hungarian For­
eign Trade Bank specialized in foreign currency trade financing of enterprises. The 
National Savings Bank, supplemented by the Postal Savings network and savings 
cooperatives, acted as the banker of the general population , private concerns, and 
local authorities. It collected deposits at low interest rates.
Other banking and financial institutions (including the Central European Inter­
national Bank,Ltd., established in 1979 as an “offshore” bank in a joint venture 
between the NBII and six foreign banks) played a peripheral role, mainly conduct­
ing foreign exchange and real estate transactions. In addition, beginning in 1983, 
the authorities set up small experimental financial institutions in the form of spe- 
cialized funds mainly to finance research and development and venture capital for 
risky projects.
In 1985, the Government adopted preliminary institutional reforms. These in­
cluded separating central banking and commercial banging functions within the 
NBH, converting the Budapest branch of the^NBH into an independent subsidiary. 
In 1986, a new commercial bank, Citibank Budapest, was established under the joint 
ownership of Citibank (80 percent) and the NBH (20 percent), authorized to offer all 
types of banking services to enterprises. Whereas, other interest rates continued to 
be determined administratively. From 1986 on, lending institutions became free to 
set loan rates to enterprises subject to the constraint that the average rate changed 
not to exceed the refinancing rate of the NBH by more than 1.5 percentage points.
The banking reform, consisting of the establishment of the two-tier banking sys­
tem, was implemented in .January 1987. The domestic commercial operations of the 
NBH and the State Development Bank were taken over by three new commercial 
banks. The new banks were set up as joint stock companies owned directly by the 
State and state enterprises. They assumed the deposits and the loan portfolios of 
their predecessors. In 1987, the authorities lifted the requirement for enterprises to 
keep their current accounts with a particular commercial bank and authorized the 
banks to use interest rates to complete for enterprise deposits and loans.
The segmentation between banking services for enterprises and the traditional 
network of savings institutions for households continued to prevail through 1988.
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Beginning in early 1990, further decentralization took place in the banking sec­
tor. Certain commercial banks were permitted to carry out trade-related foreign 
exchange operations. Banks were also permitted to make foreign currency loans for 
export pre-financing of certain export- related investments.
Other developments in the financial system was the issuing of bonds in 1981. 
Initially, local councils issued bonds to finance infrastructural projects. Since 1983 
state enterprises have also issued bonds. The State Development Bank initiated 
secondary trading of bonds in 1984. Further new developments in the securities 
market included the selling of shares and the opening in early 1988 the first brokerage 
house. Following this, the Budapest Stock Exchange formally reopened operations 
in .June 1990.
2.8 D evelopm ents and Outlook
During the 1970s, macroeconomic policies in Hungary were able to prevent chronic 
shortages and control inflation. From the late 19’iOs to the mid- to late 1980s, 
the economic policies were frequently reversed from a decentralized to a centralized 
character.
The Government in mid- 1987 adopted a medium-term program. This program 
objective was to stabilize the economy andi make some structural reforms. This 
resulted in a GDP growth of 1/2 of 1 percent in 1988 and in a 2 percent decline 
in domestic demand. The convertible current account deficit- which reached 6.3 
percent of GDP in 1986 - decreased gradually to 2.9 percent in 1988. In response to 
this deteriorating situation, the Hungarian authorities adopted policies in late 1989 
to achieve domestic and external balance. The goals of these policies were outlined 
as follows;
• tighten fiscal policy by roughly 2 percent points of GDP relative to 1989;
• limited the expansion of domestic credit to well below the rate of inflation;
• depreciate the forint against convertible currencies by 15 percent and tightened 
household access to foreign currency; and
• Towered ruble export quotas while taking administrative measures to ensure
adherence to these quotas.
13
The structural reforms included price and import liberalization, decentralization of 
the banking system, and measures to accelerate enterprise restructuring. In the fall 
of 1990, the Government adopted a comprehensive medium-term program designed 
to put in place a contemporary market economy within three years.
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3 Literature R eview  on Revealed Com parative 
Advantage
According to the International Trade Theory difference in prices from country to 
country are the basic cause of trade. They reflect differences in costs of production 
or demand conditions. Therefore, some goods must be cheaper to produce at home 
and some goods must be cheaper to produce abroad and will be imported from 
other countries. This generalization is the fundamental of the Law of Comparative 
Advantage which is defined as:
“In  a world of com petitive m arkets, trade  will occur and will be 
beneficial w henever th ere  are in ternational differences in relative costs
of production”
There are different explonations for the source 9f comparative advantage of a country. 
Ricardian theory of comparative advantage attributes relative price differences in the 
technologies and production condition.
Another explonation is given by Heckscher-Ohlin model. “It assumes that a 
capital- abundant country will tend to specialize in the production of capital-intensive 
commodities, and it will therefore export thos^ commodities in exchange for labor- 
intensive commodities, relieving its scarcity of labor.”(Kenen,1985.p.65). The theo­
rem in general terms:
T rade is based on differences in factor abundance, and it serves to  
reduce the  principal effects of those differences
One way to empirically measure comparative advantage is through Revealed Com­
parative Advantage (RCA) Indexes. Its aim is to identify the relative position of a 
country manufacturing industries in world trade through different indexes. Several 
indexes had been developed since 1965 when Ballassa formulated for the first time 
the RCA index. In the following section a literature review on different RCA indexes 
is presented.
The Revealed C om parative  Advantage Index is built upon the measures of 
trade performance of a country foreign trade. Its aim is to identify the relative posi­
tion of a county manufacturing industries in international trade through different in­
dexes. The form of each index and the interpretation given to their values has varied 
from author to author. However, the empirical and theoretical literature appear to
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agree that a country reveals a comparative advantage (disadvantage) in a commod­
ity if an index’s value is greater (less) than one. Revealed C om parative Advan- 
tage(RCA) has first been formulated by Balltissa(1965). The methodology of RCA 
deals with identifying the overall direction of a country’s trade. The suggested mea­
sures could also give information about the direction that a country’s trade should 
take in order to take advantage from international differences in production, factor 
supplies and demand. Kunimoto(1977); Hillman(1980); Bowen(1983;1985;1986); 
Ballance et.al.(1985;1986); Yeast(1985); Marchese(1989) and Webster(1991) have 
analyzed the properties of various revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indexes 
purported to approximate actual comparative advantage. Bowen(1983;1985;1986) 
and Ballance(1985;1986) have tried to identify the shortcomings of the two measures 
originally suggested: export performance and export-import s/io7’es(UNIDO,1982).^
3.1 Early A ttem pts to Quantify Com parative Advantage
Liesner(1958) was tlie first to use post- trade data to quantify comparative advan­
tage (CA). He defined indexes of relative export performance as proxies for com­
parative costs. Liesner developed a composite index which approximated bilateral 
comparative advantage between Britain and its European competitors for a single 
commodity. The following index was used for this purpose:
f
BCAV, =  ( X \ I K ) K x i l K )  =  (x n x t )
where A ’ is the amount of any specified (manufactured) commodity a exported by 
Britain;
X I  is the export volume of commodity a by any of the specified European countries 
e; and
stands for the export volume of commodity a by the seven specified European 
countries collectively (d).
Balassa(1985) adjusted Liesner’s index in order to identify the enduring effect of 
trade liberalization resulting from the Kennedy Round of GATT. His adjustment
^The export performance of RCA is:
RCA =  {X ii lX j) l{W ilW )
where is country j ’s exports of good i;
X j is total export of country j;
Wi is world ^ s trade of good i;
W  is the world’s total trade.
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consisted of the division of “a country’s share in the export of a given commodity by 
the combined exports of manufactured goods of the ten industrial countries under 
consideration” (p.l05.).
RCA2\ = (X ‘J  X t){ X 'J  XI,)
where is the export volume of commodity a by any of the following devel­
oped countries indicated by i: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany;
is the export volume of the commodity a by all eleven main industrial countries 
indicated as c;
X^^ is the export volume of seventy-four manufactured goods, m, by any of the fol­
lowing developed countries i: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany; and 
Xj^ is the export volume of seventy-four manufactured goods, m, by all eleven main 
industrial countries, c. «
When Balassa(1965) formulated RCA, assumed “uniformity in tastes and uniform 
of duties in eleven industry within each country”. Under this assumption, he con­
cluded that export-import ratios would reflect relative advantage. However, there 
is a relative difference in both taste and preferences as well as resource endowments 
among the countries. These differences unders(^re Balassa’s comparative advantage 
index.
As Wollpath( 1987) suggested, Balassa’s measure can easily be enlarged to reflect 
normalized global comparative advantage by including all countries and all traded 
commodities:
RCA3i =  ( x i / x ; ) / ( x : / x n
where X^ is country i’s export of commodity a;
XI is country i ’s export of all trade commodities t;
X ^  is world’s export of any specific commodity a; X ^  is world’s export if all traded 
commodities t;
RCA3 is equivalent to Kanamory’s export specialization index, called “tokka keisu”. 
However, Kanamory(1964.p.57-67) did not associate this index with comparative 
advantage.
Kunimoto(1977) showed that trade intensity indexes are equivalent to the ratio 
of actual-to- expected trade. He focused on a specific index which characterised the 
trade between two counties i and j. He called this as the “geographical intensity
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index” G' '^·
Qij ^  [ X ' i I I
G*·' is an index of bilateral trade intensity relating one coutry’s exports to another 
country’s imports.
3.2 A lternative Indexes
Bowen(1985) criticized Balassa’s intensity index by pointing out that “it is in general 
inappropriate to interpret deviations from unity (as presently computed) in such 
indexes as indicating comparative advantage”. He also demonstrated that Balassa’s 
index “rests upon the implicit assumption that a county exports every commodity”. 
He concluded that such an assumption is in general, inappropriate in a trading 
environment. To overcome the shortcomings of Balassa’s index, Bowen proposed 
to use two indexes namely the Net Trade Intensity Index (N1) and the Production 
Intensity Index (PI). These indexes were based upon the relationship between a 
country’s production, consumption and trade in a commodity relative to what would 
occur in a hypothetical neutral comparative advantage world:
RCA4i = N ii = {P li -  1)
f
NIi = TiliY'IY'· ) X
P ii = Q‘. n Y ‘I Y " ) x Q r ,
Ti = Q \ - c i
where is the “Net Trade Intensity” index of the commodity a by country i;
P / ‘ is the “Production Intensity” of commodity a by country i;
Y ' is the country i’s GNP;
Y ^  is the world’s GNP;
Tl is the net trade of commodity a by country i;
Q'a is the country i ’s production of commodity a; and 
G’ is country i ’s consumption of commodity a;
(5a is the world’s production volume of commodity a.
Bowen (1986,p.379) claimed that “net trade was chosen to represent comparative 
advantage” and this implied absolute advantage rather than relative advantage, 
Ballance et.al.(1985) questioned the validity of Bowen’s alternative index because 
the index depended upon the assumptions of identical and homothetic preferences 
and that countries were identical with respect to factor supplies, technology etc. 
This last assumption was depicted by the ratio of actual net trade, T ,^ to expected
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production, E{Qa) :
RCA4^^ = n /E { Q i)
where E{Qi) = {Y '/Y '^)Q :.
Consistency tests of alternative measures of relative comparative advantage (RCA) 
were conducted. Prior to the consistency tests, Ballance et.al. (1987 p.l57) em­
phasized that “while RCA may not be precisely measurable, indexes based on real 
world post-trade observations may reveal the pattern of RCA.” They also noted that 
researchers when dealing with real trade data should realize problems related to:
1. Magnitude of production, exports, consumption and imports related to coun­
try size and product significance;
2. Aggregation in the data;
t
3. Government policies that distort trade such that actual trade flows do notI *
reflect the underlying pattern of comparative advantage.
“Two classes of indexes have been analyzed. These two indexes were first, deter­
mined by using data on trade and domestic production and consumption; second, 
based on trade data only” (p.160). It was concluded that it is impossible to iden­
tify empirically a valid measure of RCA because of the high degree of inconsistency 
among alternative RCA indexes.
Vollrath (1987, 1989) examined trends of international competitiveness in agri­
culture. He based his analysis upon the concept of revealed competitive advantage 
and three global trade intensity measures. These were called as R elative Trade 
A dvantage (RCA5), R elative E xport A dvantage (RCA6) and R elative 
C om petitiveness (RCA7) respectively. These terms were expressed in the fol­
lowing way:
RCA5], =  RXA], -  R M A\
where,
R X A i = (X U X i)/(X :fX ;J  
RM Ai =  [MU M i)! {MUM:)
RCA^i = \n{RXA[) 
RCA7[ = ln(f?AAi) -  ln(RMA‘j
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R X A i is the relative export advantage of country i on commodity a;
R M A\ is the relative import advantage of country i on commodity a; 
is the export volume of country i’s on commodity a; 
is the export volume of commodity,n, of country i; where n is defined as: 
n= all traded commodities - commodity a;
X I  is the export volume on commodity a by r= world - country i;
is the export volume n by r=world-country i;
M  refers to the import volumes.
RCA6 represents the economic interpretation of revealed comparative advantage 
as being equivalent to deviations of actual from expected trade. A positive RCA5, 
RCA6, or RCA7 reveals a comparative advantage, while a negative value reveals a 
comparative disadvantage. These indexes may come closer to measuring true com­
parative advantage than alternative RCA measures, because they eliminate country 
and commodity double counting in world trade. These indexes make clear distinc-f *
tion between a specific commodity and all other commodities and between a specific 
country and the rest of the world. RCA6 index was also recommended to use in 
some cases because it is less susceptible to policy-induced distortions than RCA5 or 
RCA7 (Vollratli and Vo,1990). f
The measures RCA5 and RCA7 used both export and import data; therefore, 
embody both the relative demand and relative supply dimensions. Another at­
traction of these indexes was that RCA5 and RCA7 were consistent with the real 
world phenomenon of two-way trade. It was also recommended that analyst may use 
RCA7 instead of RCA5 (at high level of commodity aggregation) because the former 
balances the supply and demand dimensions of comparative advantage equally.
3.3 R ecent T heoretical D evelopm ents
Webster(1991) argued and gave evidence that RCA measures were giving poor re­
sults. He also claimed that this poor performance of RCA measures was “not likely 
to be attributed to problems predominantly associated with measurement itselP 
(p.937). He also proposed and evaluated another measure as a complement of ex­
isting techniques.
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3.3.1 Aggregate Trade Imbalance
Basic theories of comparative advantage assume trade balance; which means that 
it reflects equilibrium trade flows and is not influenced by disequilibrium at the 
macroeconomic level. However, this is not the real case.
Webster suggested to adjust the measure of RCA by taking account of macroe­
conomic disequilibriums.'* However, he admitted that “there are two fundamental 
problems with making such adjustments. First, the appropriate macroeconomic 
equilibrium is not immediately apparent. Second, should we assume that an over­
all trade imbalance induces an equiproportionate bias in the RCA index for each 
commodity or would certain activities be disproportionately affected?”(p.938).
An RCA analysis was conducted to assess whether aggregate imbalance were a 
likely influence on cross-country rankings of RCA. RCA was calculated for each (3 
digit) commodity and for each country by using the following formula:
R C A j k  =  { x j k -  m j k ) ' / { x j k +  m j k )
than a simple adjustment for aggregate imbalance was performed in visible trade by
using:
RCA'jk = RCAjk -  [(Xk -  Mk)/{Xk + Mk)]
where RCAjk is the revealed comparative advintage of country k on commodity j; 
Xjk refers to the export volume of commodity j of country k; 
rrijk is the import volume of commodity j of country k;
Xk and Mk are county ks total visible exports and imports.
The conclusion was that visible trade imbalance did not appear to have any sig­
nificant impact on the ranking of countries within the same commodity classification 
according to RCA.
The review of RCA indexes suggested that for the Hungarian case'Vollrath (1987, 
1989) indexes are the most appropriate ones. Also Webster (1991) admitted that 
RCA measures are “more kind to single country, many commodity study.”
Ideally, low level of aggregated data should be used to construct the RCA indexes; 
however, the unavailability of such data forced us to use high level of aggregated 
data. Nevertheless, Webster showed that this practical approach will not result in 
biased indexes.
''Extensive literature concerning appropriate adjustment of this type see Greenway and 
Milwell,1986
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“it seems unlikely that aggregation difficulties are a systematic source of 
inconsistency in country study. Thus, on balance we should not expect 
implicit differences in aggregation to affect ranking of RCA”(p.941).
In the following section the nature of the Hungarian trade in the period, 1975- 88 
is analysed trough the comparative advantage method.
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4 An A nalysis o f Comparative Advantage of Hun­
garian Economy
The objective of this analysis is to examine trends of international competitiveness in 
foreign trade of Hungary. The analysis is based on the index formulated by Vollrath 
in 1987. This method is based upon the concept of revealed comparative advan­
tage and trade intensity measures. This is called as Relative Com petitiveness 
(RCA7). This index is expressed in the following way:
RCA7[ = \n{RXA[) -  \n{RMAi)where
RXA5i = (x'jxi)/(x:/xi)
RMAi = (M ‘J M i ) l ( M l lM : )
R X A \  is the relative export axlvantage of country i on commodity a;
RM A\  is the relative import advantage of country i on commodity a;
XI  is the export volume of country i’s on commodity a;
is the export volume of commodity,n, of country i; where n is defined as: 
n= all traded commodities - commodity a;
X^ is the export volume on commodity a by r= world - country i;
X^ is the export volume n by r=world-countr^ i;
M  refers to the import volumes.
A positive RCA 7 reveals a com parative advantage, while a negative value 
reveals a com parative disadvantage. This index may come closer to measuring 
true comparative advantage than alternative RCA measures, because it eliminates 
country and commodity double counting in world trade. This index makes clear 
distinction between a specific commodity and all other commodities and between a 
specific country and the rest of the world.
The measure RCA7 uses both export and import data; therefore, embodyes both 
the relative demand and relative supply dimensions. Another attraction of this index 
is that RCA7 is consistent with the real world phenomenon of two-way trade.
4.1 D ata
The Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (RCA7i) is applied for a sample of 9 
Hungarian commodity groups in four different geographical areas and for the period 
1975-88. The commodity groups are classified according the CMEA classification,
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which is called the CMEA Trade nomenclature (CTN). This nomenclature distin­
guishes nine categories, which are the following:
• CTNl = Industrial Machinery and Equipment (including transportation ma­
chinery;
• CTN2 = Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, Metals;
• CTN3 = Chemical, Fertilizers, Rubber;
• CTN4 = Building Materials and Construction Parts;
• CTN5 = Raw Materials of Vegetable and Animal Origin (non-food);
• CTN6 = Live Animals (not for slaughter);
• CTN7 = Raw Materials for the Production of Foodstuff;
«
• CTN8 = Foodstuff; ·
• CTN9 = Industrial Consumer Goods (other than food).
COMECON Data 1989 handbook reports that in most cases a breakdown into four 
or five commodity groups only was possible; these are aggregation of the nine original 
groups. For this study the level of agrégation of nine commodity groups is used.
The four different geographic region are: the socialist countries; the CMEA coun­
tries; the western industrialized countries and developing countries.® Each commod­
ity groups’ RCA7i is calculated respect to the total Hungarian trade volume.
4.2 Em pirical R esults
Table 1. summarizes Hungary’s revealed comparative advantage in its overall trade 
of industrial maschinery and equipments(CTN 1), Live Animals (CTN 6), Raw Ma­
terials for the Production of Foodstuff (CTN 7), Foodstuff (CTN 8) and Industrial
®Socialist countries: this group includes, in addition to the CMEA countries, the Peoples’ 
Republic of China, Yugoslavia and North Korea
CMEA:Bulgaria, CSSR, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Albania, Cuba, Mongolia and 
Vietnam
Industrialized  W est: Canada, USA, Japan, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Germany; Italy; Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom 
D evelop in g  countries
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Table 1: Average Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA7i) of Commodity Groups
in the Period 1975-88.
CTN 1 
CTN 2-5 
CTN 6-8 
CTN 9
Socialist CMEA Western Developing 
countries countries countries
A
(1.41)
D
(-2.29)
A
(2.07)
D
(-0..31)
A
1.16
D
(-2.39)
A
(2.28)
A
(0.15)
D
-0.96
A
(1.04)
A
(1.96)
A
(0.39)
A
3.99
D
(-0.79)
D
(- 1.16) 
D
(- 0.03)
Overall
average
A
1.39
D
(-1.10)
A
(1.29)
A
(0.05)
Consumer Goods (CTN 9). The commodity groups of Fuels, Mineral Raw Mate­
rials, Metals(CTN 2), Chemiciil, Fertilizers, Rubber(CTN 3), Raw Materials and 
Construction Parts (CTN 4) and Raw Materials for the Production of Foodstuff 
(CTN 5) revealed disadvantage in the total trade. This general results suggest that 
Hungary revealed comparative advantage not only in labor intensive goods such as 
food products (CTN 6-8) but also in capital Intensive products such as industrial 
maschinery and industrial consumer goods (CTN 1 and 9 respectively). Even though 
Hungary was not rich in capital but the agreement made during the 1975s required 
that the country would focus and specialize in capital intensive products. The re­
sources for these goods were provided by CMEA countries for a price set among 
such countries.
In the same time, this situation allowed for Hungary to use CMEA cheaper energy 
to produce high quality goods at lower prices which made it possible to export in 
the world market. ®
The Table 1. also gives information about the relative position of each commod­
ity group in a specific geographic area. Hungary revealed comparative advantage in 
commodity groups such as indusirial maschinery and equipment (CTNl) and Live 
Animals (CTN 6), Raw Materials for the Production of Foodstuff (CTN 7), Food-
®CTN 1; Industrial Machinery and Equipment
CTN 2-5: Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, Metals, Chemical, Fertilizers, Rubber, Building Materials 
and Construction Parts, Raw Materials of Vegetable and Animal Origin (non-food);
CTN 6-8: Live Animals, Raw Materials for the Production of Foodstuff, Foodstuff;
CTN 9: Industrial Consumer Goods (other than food).
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stuff (CTN 8) and Industrial Consumer in both the Socialist and CMEA countries. 
This confirms the situation set by the CMEA agreement on production specification. 
In the Western countries, Hungary could reveal comparative advantage not only in 
commodity groups such as: Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, Metals(CTN 2), Chem­
ical, Fertilizers, Rubber(CTN 3), Raw Materials and Construction Parts (CTN 4) 
and Raw Materials for the Production of Foodstuff (CTN 5) food stuff (CTN 2- 
5) but also in commodity groups such as CTN 6-8 and industrial consumer goods 
(CTN 9).
Hungary’s competitiveness in these products could be explained by: first, its 
ability to use cheaper energy and raw material with respect to the western coun­
tries; second, Hungary had always a strong agriculture which let the country to be 
competitive in foodstuff (CTN 6- 8). In the average, Hungary revealed comparative 
advantage only in commodity group CTN 1 in the developing countries. This could 
be explained by the fact that developing countries being poor in capital are special­
ized in labor intensive production. Consequently, developing countries demand for 
capital intensive products is greater than labor intensife products because of luck of 
capital and technology. These countries suppley of labor intensive products is high, 
therefore their demand of agricultural products is low. As a result, Hungary can 
not reveale comparative advantage in such pi'oducts in the trade with developing 
countries.
The results, were also analyzed according the periodical change occurring in the 
reform process. More specifically, the 1975-88 period was divided in three period 
which were:
• 1975-80 Period of Centralization;
• 1981-84 Period of Decentralization;
• 1985-88 Period of Stagnation.
The averages of each commodity groups for each period were reported in Table 
2. The overall average indicates that in the 1975-88 period Hungary revealed com­
parative advantage in all the commodity groups except in the trade of commodity 
groups of Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, Metals(CTN 2), Chemical, Fertilizers, Rub- 
ber(CTN 3), Raw Materials and Construction Parts (CTN 4) and Raw Materials 
for the Production of Foodstuff (CTN 5) The direction of comparative advantage 
with the socialist and CMEA countries was the same all through the period of anal­
yses exept for the commodity group of industrial consumer groups (CTN 9). This
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commodity group revealed comparative disadvantage in the 1975-80 period than 
revealed comparative advantage in the following periods (1981-88). This might due 
to the increased trade level of Hungary within the CMEA trade. Consequently, the 
CMEA countries imported this commodity groups from Hungary becouse Hungary 
was the country specialized in such production under the CMEA agreement. Which 
meant a comparative advantage in commodity groups of industrial machinery and 
industrial raw material. In the trade with western countries only the commodity 
group of industrial machinery revealed disadvantage and in the case of developing 
countries this commodity group revealed comparative advantage. The compara­
tive disadvantage revealed in the trade with the western countries is in agreement 
with the international trade characteristics. Western countries are characterized by 
a capital intensive production. Their production is organized according the latest 
technology; consequently, their product prices are low. Even though Hungary re­
ceived cheap raw material and energy for production from CMEA, the production 
was not according the technological developm«nts prevailing in the western produc­
tion. As a result, Hungary could not pi’oduce at the same level of efficiency as the 
western industries. This condition negatively effected the comparative axivantage of 
such goods.
In the trade with the developing countries, Hungary lost her comparative ad­
vantage with the commodity group of industrial equipment and machinery. This 
is associated with the decreased demand from the developing countries because of 
their effort to industrialize in the production of similar commodity groups.
The yearly development of RCA7 index for each commodity group is also reported 
in Fig.6,7,8, and 9. In Figure 6. the commodity group of industrial machinery 
and equipment revealed comparative advantage index’s pattern during the 1975-88 
period was plotted. This figure gives a clear idea about CTN I ’s position in the four 
geographic areas (Socialist countries, CMEA, Western countries and Developing 
countries). The CTN 1 commodity group revealed comparative disadvantage all 
through this period in the western countries.
CTN 1 revealed always comparative advantage in both the Socialist countries and 
CMEA. The RCA7 index’s pattern in this two geographic areas followed almost a 
parallel pattern. In the developing countries, CTN 1 always revealed comparative 
advantage. Its pattern was declining in the first period of time which continued 
to increase between 1979-1982. However, RCA7 declined after 1982. This peri­
odical change may be due: first to the oil crises occurring in 1973; second to the 
industrialization effort initiated in the 1980s by the developing countries.
27
Table 2: Average Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA7) of all Commodity
Socialist
countries
CMEA Western
countries
Developing
countries
Overall
average
1975-80 CTN 1 A A D A A
(1.25) (0.77) (- 2.19) (4.09) (0.98)
CTN 2-5 D D A D D
(-1.84) (- 1.91) (0.65) (-0.74) (-0.96)
CTN 6-8 A A A D A
(2.021) (2.29) (2.18) (-1.13) (1.34)
CTN 9 D D ' A A A
(-0.59) (- 1.45) (0.57) (2.52) (0.02)
1981-84 CTN 1 A A D A A
(1.09) (1.05) (- 2.34) (4.98) (1.19)
CTN 2-5 D D A D D
(-2.82) (- 2.81) fl.02) (-1.34) (-1.49)
CTN 6-8 A A A D A
(2.41) (2.54) (1.56) (-0.67) (1.46)
CTN 9 D A A D A
(- 0.105) (0.26) (0.22) (-0.07) (0.08)
1985-88 CTN 1 A A D A A
(1.89) (1.65) (- 2.59) (2.89) (0.96)
CTN 2-5 D D A D D
(-2.20) (- 2.46) (1.45) (-0.28) (-0.88)
CTN 6-8 A A A D A
(1.77) (2.00) (2.13) (-1.67) (1.06)
CTN 9 D A A D A
(- 0.23) (0.33) (0.39) (-0.26) (0.05)
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Figure 6: Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA7) of Commodity Group CTN 1
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Figure 7: Revealed Comparative Advantage(RCA7) of Commodity Group CTN 2-5
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Figure 8: Revealed Comparative Advantage(RCA7) of Commodity Group CTN 6-8
Figure 7. also confirms the result of the previous Tables (1 and 2) such as that the 
commodity group CTN 2-5 revealed comparative advantage only in the trade with 
western countries. In the other geographic areas, this commodity group revealed 
always a comparative disadvantage. The decline occurring in 1982 in both the 
Socialist countries and C‘CMEA could be associated with the price policy changes 
occurring in the same period. Hungary after 1980s adjusted its prices every year 
according the world rate. This adjustment occfhrred every five years prior to 1980.
Figure 8. depicts the trend that the commodity group CTN 6-8 revealed during 
the 1975-88 period in the four geographic areas. These commodity groups revealed 
comparative advantage in the Socialist countries, CMEA and Western countries. 
But they revealed comparative disadvantage in the developing countries. This dis­
advantage was due to the fact that the demand of developing countries for food 
commodities was lower than for industrial goods. The developing countries were 
able to produce and be self sufficient in labor intensive products.
The revealed comparative advantage’s declined in the western countries in the 
period 1981-83 was due to the effect of recession. The decrease in comparative 
disadvantage of Hungary in the trade of CTN 6-8 in the developing countries in the 
period of 1982-85 is associated with the period of industrialization of such countries. 
Which made them to shift their capital towards industry, consequently their demand 
for agricultural products increased.
Figure 9. indicates the development of RCA7 of commodity group of industrial 
consumer groups in the four geographical regions. In both the Socialist countries
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Figure 9: Revealed Comparative Advantage(RCA7) of Commodity Group CTN 9
and CMEA this commodity group revealed* comparative disadvantage in the 1975- 
80 period. The disadvantage shifted to advantage between 1981-1984 than declined 
again. This improvement in advantage was due to the increased demand of such 
countries for industrial commodity groups. The decline was caused by the economic 
decline prevailed in these countries.
The industrial commodity groups revealed comparative advantage in the western 
countries except in the period of 1980- 83 which was effected by the recession pre­
vailed in these countries in the same period of time. Similar pattern occurred in the 
developing countries.
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5 Conclusion
Since 1968, Hungary experienced a periodical change in its reform process. The 
first four years after the 1968 - Reform implementation the Hungarian economy 
improved. This was also reflected in the trade values (exports increased by 9.6% 
and imports increased by 7.5%) realized in 1972.
Between 1972-75 Hungary decided to shift its trade balance toward the CMEA 
countries. This required also an adjustment in its economic management setting. In 
1975, Hungary implemented a five years plan which was determined according the 
objectives of the Comprehensive Program of CMEA. This included decisions such 
as: the investment structure was determined largely by big projects chosen at the 
government level; Hungry had to specialize and set its industry in areas such as 
petroleum- based synthetics, aluminum industry, vehicle production and computer 
industry. However, these programs were all based on CMEA cooperations and served 
the CMEA’s goals.
Ricket(1989) claimed that some of these investments were simply irrational. The 
projects were directed toward energy- intensive industries at a time when energy 
prices were rising. They were not market oriented and only by chance these projects 
were directed toward areas in which Hungary had a competitive advantage.
In 1980, the Government let small private businesses to establish. A new period 
of decentralization took over the country. Its OTect was evident in 1984 when the 
GDP reached 2.7 with respect the 1983 value which was 0.7. However, in the 
same period of time the external current account balance in convertible currencies 
started to decrease. In 1984 showed a 0.3 value which reached its minimum in 
1986 with a value of -6.3. Hungary could not recover its economic situation with 
limited decentralization measures. Consequently, the country entered in the so called 
stagnation period (1985-1988).
In 1987, the public started to express their discontent. The Government realized 
that political changes had to be made in order to achieve further economic improve­
ment. Therefore, the Government conducted the first free elections in March-April 
1990. The objective of the new Government was to shift the Hungarian economy to 
a complete open market economy. To be able to understand Hungary’s manufactur­
ing productions’ comparative advantage revealed in the period 1975-88 the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage Index was applied for nine commodity groups.
The results of this study suggest that under the old political and economical 
setting Hungary should have completely abandon the trade of commodity groups
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of industrial raw material and industrial consumer goods towards the socialist and 
CMEA countries. In the trade with the western countries, Hungary should have 
focus on the commodity groups that gave the country comparative advantage like 
industrial raw material, foodstuff and industrial consumer goods and not trade at 
all capital intensive goods such as industrial machinery. Finally, Hungary could 
have shift its trade of industrial machinery from the western countries toward the 
developing countries where Hungary revealed comparative advantage in this specific 
good. These conclusions are valid for a system which survived during 1975-88; 
however, the political and economical situation rotated by 180 degree in Hungary 
after 1989. Consequently, it would be rather misleading to give such suggestions for 
the open market oriented Hungary.
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